Volume 11

Issue 4

Article 14

1966

Conflict of Laws and Joint Bank Accounts - An Autopsy of a Case
Joseph C. Kelly

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Contracts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons,
Jurisdiction Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph C. Kelly, Conflict of Laws and Joint Bank Accounts - An Autopsy of a Case, 11 Vill. L. Rev. 840
(1966).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Kelly: Conflict of Laws and Joint Bank Accounts - An Autopsy of a Case
840

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

CONFLICT OF LAWS AND JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
AN AUTOPSY OF A CASE
I.

-

INTRODUCTION

The disparity between community and non-community property
systems with their differing methods of protecting familial economic
interests has produced a plethora of conflict of laws problems with regard
to marital property. These problems have multiplied with the ever increasing mobility of spouses and property between nations employing
these two divergent systems. The difficulties that this fluidity can cause
was demonstrated in Wyatt v. Fulrath,' a recent New York decision involving Spanish domiciliaries who had deposited assets in New York
banks and executed joint and survivorship bank account agreements which
were recognized by the laws of New York but purportedly prohibited
by the laws of Spain. When a dispute arising over the disposition of the
funds reached the New York Court of Appeals, it had to choose not only
between the law of New York, a common law state, and the law of Spain,
a community property state, but also between a Spanish duchess and her
disgruntled heirs. It is the purpose of this comment to examine the
rationale of the court's decision, and to expose the relevant policy considerations which the court might have employed in arriving at a solution to
the novel issue presented.
II. Wyatt v. Fulrath
During a prolonged period of political instability, a Spanish duke
and his wife, both Spanish domiciliaries, placed cash and securities in
bank accounts in London and New York. The New York accounts were
established for the most part in 'the names of both spouses, while the
London accounts were established in the names of the duke, the duchess,
and their daughter. The parties made the deposits in the New York banks
subject to a right of withdrawal by either party, and both expressly either
agreed in writing that the New York law of survivorship would apply
or signed a written forn of survivorship account under New York law
which would have the effect of passing the property to the survivor in
the event either should die.2 With the duke's approval, the duchess subsequently exercised her right of withdrawal and transferred some of the
assets in the joint accounts to her separate account; upon the duke's
later demise, she also transmitted some of the assets in London to her
sole name in New York. Shortly thereafter, the duchess passed away and
left a will giving one-half of the two million dollar estate in the New York
1. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d
2. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 134.

169, 211

N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
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banks to three loyal friends and the other half to her two living children. 3
The two children and the grandchild, who were the sole and equal benefactors under the duke's will and Spanish law, 4 were dissatisfied with this
disposition. As a consequence, they had an administrator institute an
action in New York against the wife's executor to establish title to onehalf of the cash and securities held in the accounts, claiming it as the
husband's share of the spouses' community property. Their claim of
ownership rested on the peculiarities of the Spanish Civil Code,5 which
they cited as the controlling law. According to them, Spanish law provides
that all property owned by a husband and wife, with certain exceptions,
constitutes community property, and on the death of either spouse, onehalf goes to the survivor and at least two-thirds of the remainder passes
to the heirs of the deceased spouse. Furthermore, they contended that no
gift, agreement, or transaction of any type, including the method employed,
could substantially alter this statutory scheme and that consequently
one-half of the property belonged to the husband. The wife's executor,
on the other hand, maintained that the law of New York, which recognizes the right of spouses to alter their property rights through the medium
of joint and survivorship bank accounts, was applicable. 6 Such being the
case, the property transferred from the joint custodial accounts to the
sole account of the duchess, as well as the balance remaining in the
joint and survivorship bank accounts at the duke's death, were the property
of the duchess.
A closely divided court affirmed the lower court's award of the
assets to the duchess' executor and held that the public policy of the state
required that New York law govern as to the funds transferred to state
banks during the lifetime of the duke, since the duke and duchess had
deposited their property in New York banks and had specifically "requested
New York law to apply to their respective rights."7 With respect to the
property transferred to New York banks by the duchess after her husband's death, the court remanded with instructions to determine how a
London court would decide the question, suggesting that the form of
instruction or agreement pursuant to which the property was placed in
the accounts would be particularly relevant.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Desmond contended that the
court's failure to apply the law of Spain, the matrimonial domicile, was
contrary to all established conflict of laws principles, including the principles of international comity. Using contacts as a touchstone, he pointed out
that the duke and duchess were Spanish domiciliaries and nationals, neither
of whom had ever visited New York state, and that New York's only
3. Brief for Appellee, p. 25, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637,
264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
4. Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 6, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d
637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).

5. See

FISHER,

CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN 9,

1315, 1334, 1394, 1407 (4th ed. 1930).

6. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 134.
7. Wyatt v. Fulrath, supra at 173, 211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
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contact with the case was the fact that the parties had deposited the
property in the New York banks for emergency safekeeping. He concluded by noting that the supposed intent of the parties to substitute New
York law for Spanish law was evidenced by no more than the routine
signing of joint-account forms which were supplied by the New York
depositaries.
III. SPURIOUS CONFLICT

When the operative facts of a case occur in two or more jurisdictions
and a litigant urges the application of a law other than that of the forum,
the court must initially determine the divergency, if any, between the law
of the foreign jurisdiction and the lex fori. This threshold investigation
will enable the forum in many instances to avoid a superfluous and
potentially corrosive decision of a spurious conflict. On the basis of one
authority,8 it does seem plausible to conclude that the New York courts
improperly executed this task in Wyatt, and as a result, incorrectly decided that the disposition of the case should turn upon which law was
applied.
The Wyatt court based its interpretation of Spanish law on the
testimony of a well-qualified expert who represented the three heirs.9
According to the expert's testimony, the law of Spain prohibits spouses
from altering their property rights post-nuptially by gift on agreement.
This conclusion is weakened considerably by Professor DeFuniak's assertion in his treatise on community property that the proscription against
gifts extends only to the spouses' separate estates, and that renunciation
of communal rights is permitted, provided that legitimate rights of inheritance are not prejudiced by a surrender of already acquired interests.' 0
Even a narrow construction of the term "prejudice" would not render
untenable the opinion that a gift from husband to wife would not prejudice
heirs who have already been benefited by the addition of over a million
dollars to their coffers." Such a construction would isolate the result from
choice of law and obviate the need for choosing between the law of Spain
and the law of New York.
Even assuming there was not a misinterpretation of Spanish law, the
possibility of error points to familiarity with forum law as a persuasive
reason for application of the lex fori, especially when an understanding
of foreign law is further impeded by a language barrier. Eminent authority 12 has recognized this intimacy as an impelling consideration for
selection of the local law. But if a desire not to delve into the nuances of
8. 1 DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943).
9. Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-4, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637,

264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
10. 1 DeFuniak, supra note 8, at 7.
11. Reply Brief for Appellant pp. 3-6, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211
N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1969).
12. Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. Rnv.
959 (1952).
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Spanish law influenced the court's choice of law in Wyatt, an articulation
or intimation of that course of reasoning does not appear in the opinion, and
in its absence, one can assume that in all probability this consideration did
not enter into the decision.
IV. PRECEDENT

In arriving at a satisfactory solution, the New York courts could have
looked to two lines of decisions for guidance, both of which pointed to
the application of forum law. There were a substantial number of cases 13
holding that the validity of joint custody account agreements was to be
determined by the law of the situs. None of these cases, however, involved
a situation where the law of the domicile prohibited a post-nuptial transfer
of community property into separate properties. Conversely, a second line
of authority,14 while embracing the latter situation, did not involve joint
custodial agreements. The court, therefore, had to make a singular decision and, in so doing, weigh carefully the value of utilizing prior authorities, which like so many precedents in conflict of laws might not give
expression to the dominant social policies affecting the case at bar.
The Court of Appeals, without even a passing reference to the
decisions involving joint custodial agreements, turned to the cases dealing
with post-nuptial transfers of community property, and one case in particular from their own jurisdiction, in arriving at a decision. In Hutchinson
v. Ross,15 a husband and wife, domiciliaries of Quebec, executed an
ante-nuptial agreement providing for the establishment of a trust of
personalty. Upon inheriting a large fortune, the husband decided to set
up a larger trust for his wife and children, and his wife ostensibly renounced her interest in the earlier ante-nuptial agreement. A New York
trust company agreed to act as trustee and accepted the delivery of
securities. The law of Quebec provided that, after the marriage, an antenuptial agreement may not be altered in any way, and that neither spouse
may transfer to the other any substantial part of his or her fortune.
The husband subsequently brought suit to have the trust set aside. The
court agreed that under the community property laws of Quebec the trust
was invalid, but held that the laws of New York, and not the laws of
Quebec, were controlling. Judge Lehman bottomed his decision on the
implied intent of the parties and the public policy of New York, which
was vocalized in a statute post-dating the trust agreement and providing
for the application of New York law to trust estates when the parties
so declared. In his dissent in the instant case, Judge Desmond questioned
the relevance of the Hutchinson rationale, asserting that the conflict of
laws policies and principles applicable to a bailee are at variance with
those applicable to a trustee. While the court's decision might properly
be viewed as expressing a desire to protect trustees, it can more realisti13. E.g., Colclazier v. Colclazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956).
14. See MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN THZ CONFLICT OF LAws (1952).
15. 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65, 266 N.Y.S. 1 (1933).
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cally be regarded as evincing a solicitude for New York financial institutions and for a wife and children who would have been deprived of the
benefits of a trust estate had Quebec law been controlling.
V.

REALISM -

MODUS OPERANDI

The desire to do justice in the individual case and to effectuate the
policies embodied in local laws exert a strong influence in the resolution
of a conflict's problem. 6 When local policies vigorously dictate the application of the lex fori and such application will accomplish an equitable end,
the likelihood of an enlightened court selecting a law other than the local
law is negligible. This conclusion would appear to be countenanced not
only by Hutchinson v. Ross, but also by the Wyatt decision.
The public policy of New York seems to be directed at encouraging
non-residents to do business with local banks and, if they desire, to have
state law govern their rights, regardless of the law of their domicile.
This policy is manifested in constitutional" and statutory provisions
exempting securities owned by non-residents from taxation and recognizing their right to select New York law as controlling with regard to
an inter-vivos trust of personal property' or a will disposing of in-state
assets.' 9 Furthermore, a decision stimulating local investment, even if
such stimulation would cause a slight rupture in another country's marital
scheme, would not be an anomaly in a state which enjoys the reputation
as being the financial capital of the world.
It was implied in appellants' briefs 20 that the duchess had failed to
receive her just share of the duke's property at the settlement of his
estate in Spain. These hints of impropriety become convincing when one
notes that the duchess professedly renounced the life estate given her by
the duke in favor of her heirs. Rough justice would suggest that the
three loyal friends of the widow should not be deprived of their bounties
by affluent heirs when there is some evidence that the heirs had perhaps
already received more than they deserved. As these equitable considerations coincided with the public policy of the state, the court needed
only to find a legal basis to justify a realistic result calling for the application of New York law.
VI. INTENT

In a non-commercial setting it seems desirable to hold that the law of
the domicile should govern the interests of a husband and wife and their
heirs and devisees. 21 However, when a forum state has a genuine conflict
16. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 12.
17. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (1938).
18. N.Y.

12a.
47.

PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §

19. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW

§

20. See Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-6, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169,
211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
21. See Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatements of
Conflict of Laws - A Critique, 46 IowA L. REv. 713 (1961).
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of policy with another state which has a substantial connection with the
transaction, intent can be placed on the judicial scales to tip the balance
in favor of the law of the forum. This was the approach taken by the
Court of Appeals in Wyatt. The difficulty presented by it lies in the
fact that, in the great majority of cases, the parties' intent cannot easily
be ascertained.
It is difficult to believe, even in view of Chief Judge Desmond's
suggestion to the contrary, that the duke and duchess did not know, or
did not understand, the legal implications of their acts. The duke was
sophisticated in the ways of finance, had prudently directed the investment
of his property through the course of his life,22 and could have in all likelihood instructed the bank to adopt an alternative plan if he so desired.
Furthermore, letters passing between the duke and the banks clearly
indicate that the duke understood that the property would go to the duchess
23
on his death, and, that he did not object to this pattern of disposition.
When the effectuation of the intention of the parties will not seriously
violate the laws of a foreign state, it does not seem improper for a court
to give expression to the parties' desire.
VII. CONCLUSION

On the international plane, more than on the interstate level, judicial
sagacity and discretion must be employed in the resolution of conflict of
laws problems. The full faith and credit clause and the privileges and
immunities clauses are non-operative in this area; and the due process
and equal protection clauses, if operative, 24 have a very limited and
undeveloped utility. The New York court in the instant case cannot be
castigated for arriving at a decision that accords with the public policy of
the state and intentions of the parties, and, at the same time, attempts to
accommodate the human aspect as equitably as possible.
Joseph C. Kelly
22. See Brief for Appellee, p. 15, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637,
264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
23. Id. at 8-12.
24. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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